SharePoint (On-Premises Only) ToolShell Exploit

Threats
Vulnerabilities

SharePoint (On-Premises Only) ToolShell Exploit


by Mike Puglia

4 min read


*Updated July 31, 2025 with additional Details and IOCs

A series of new and previously patched vulnerabilities, discovered by Eye Security, have been widely exploited in Microsoft’s SharePoint On-Premises Server software (cloud SharePoint instances are not impacted).  Dubbed “ToolShell”, threat actors can exploit the vulnerability to execute code remotely over the network – essentially giving them access and complete control over the server.

Detection

Both RocketCyber and Datto EDR have detection rules to alert based on activity related to this exploit and are actively hunting for indicators of compromise.

Recommendations

Microsoft recommends customers apply the released patches, enable AMSI in full mode, rotate ASP.Net machine keys and restarting IIS (Click Here for Microsoft Guidance).

However, these attacks were being conducted prior to the disclosure and patches.  Given the rapidly evolving campaigns by threat actors, you should assume any SharePoint On-Premises servers that were internet facing were compromised and organizations should re-image/re-install the SharePoint Application.

*Note: Applying the patch or re-imaging may impact your ability to recover forensic data for analysis at a later time, it is recommended to do a full snapshot/backup of the machine prior to taking these steps.

Details

ToolShell is a PowerShell-based web shell purpose built for SharePoint.  It leverages .NET, APIs and PowerShell techniques to evade detection and gives attackers command and control, abilities to move laterally within the network, credential dumping and executing remote powershell commands.  Additionally, modifications to scheduled tasks, SharePoint Timer and the registry have been used to enhance persistence.

Initial compromises used file-based webshells (i.e. spinstall0.aspx), however, in-memory ToolShell payloads have now been seen in the wild which does not require writing a file to disk, making compromises stealthier and harder to detect (another reason to assume compromise as mentioned in the “Recommendations” section above).

APT & Ransomware Groups

The following threat actors have been observed actively exploiting these vulnerabilities, although it should be assumed that any threat actor may not be taking action as exploits are widely available:

APT 27 Emissary Panda

APT31 ZirConium

Bluesky

Storm-2603

Linen Typhoon

Violet Typhoon

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Domains:

vpn-checkup[.]com

cloudlocker-drop[.]xyz           

secureivantiupdate[.]net     

msupdate[.]updatemicfosoft[.]com

IP Addresses:

139.59.11.66

103.151.172.92

34.72.225.196

141.164.60.10

188.130.206.168

131.226.2.6

206.166.251.228

64.176.50.109

34.121.207.116

134.199.202.205

45.191.66.77

146.70.165.94

83.136.182.237

45.87.213.227

45.141.56.114

182.2.79.164

89.46.223.88

139.144.199.41

154.223.19.106

45.77.155.170

95.179.158.42

149.40.50.15

185.197.248.131

172.174.82.132

162.158.94.72

162.158.14.149

162.158.19.169

162.158.94.121

18.143.202.126

108.162.221.103

162.158.90.110

128.49.100.57

45.40.52.75

18.143.202.204

18.143.202.156

18.143.202.185

154.47.29.4

162.158.14.86

103.186.30.186

185.172.110.45

45.88.12.201

104.238.159.149

198.251.90.122

107.191.58.76

96.9.125.147

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Mike Puglia

General Manager, Security Products

Mike Puglia brings over 25 years of technology, strategy, and cybersecurity experience to his role as Kaseya’s General Manager of Security Products. He is responsible for all products across Kaseya’s portfolio of security solutions.

Prior to joining Kaseya, Mike led the technical program management integration of real-time collaboration technologies into Salesforce’s Chatter Social Enterprise platform. Earlier in his career, Mike served in technical and product roles at applications security company Veracode, database security company Lumigent Technologies and network security Bluesocket.

Mike holds a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from the University of New Hampshire and an MBA from the Carroll Graduate School of Management at Boston College.